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WHAT 30 YEARS OF CHEVRON TEACH US ABOUT
THE REST OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Abbe R. Gluck*
Chevron, the most famous rule of administrative law, is also a central
doctrine of statutory interpretation. But Chevron is understood and
operates quite differently from most of the other statutory interpretation
rules. This Essay explores six such divergences and how they illuminate of
some the most important, unanswered questions of the statutory era.
First, thirty years of Chevron highlight the enduring puzzle over the legal
status of statutory interpretation methodology in general. Chevron is a
―precedent;‖ the remaining statutory interpretation doctrines do not even
rise to the status of ―law.‖ But second, Chevron’s own fate is inextricably
tied to these other rules, because Chevron relies on them in its famous twostep test. Critics blame Chevron’s manipulability, but arguably the blame
lies more with the legal indeterminacy of all of the other statutory
interpretation rules upon which Chevron relies. Third, as the Chevron
doctrine has evolved, it has become more attendant to the realities of how
Congress drafts statutes—realities in which the Court seems wholly
uninterested when it comes to the rest of statutory interpretation. Relatedly,
the Court shows no shame in acknowledging Chevron’s source; the Court
created the doctrine. The jurisprudential status of the other interpretive
rules, however, remains ambiguous, with the federal courts loathe to admit
that they have fashioned a common law of statutory interpretation. Fourth,
Chevron, as further developed by Mead, is the one instance in which the
Court has explicitly used interpretive doctrine to influence the procedures
that Congress uses. Again in contrast, across the rest of the statutory
landscape, the Court has refused to enter the sausage factory, continuing to
reject the idea that courts should interfere in the lawmaking process, or that
how a law is made should affect its interpretation. Fifth, Chevron’s
evolution has blown a hole through conventional notions of statutory stare
decisis, but at the same time the Court now seems afraid that it has given
away too much. Today, agency statutory interpretations may displace
judicial precedents but, when agencies are not in the picture, the Court
hoards power: it gives its own statutory precedents ―super‖ stare decisis
effect; is stingy when it comes to interpreting congressional overrides; and
won’t cede any control over interpretive rules to any other branch.
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School. Thanks to Peter Shane and Chris Walker for the
invitation to participate and to Molly Alarcon, Carter Greenbaum, and Grace Heusner for
excellent research assistance.
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Finally—and this is a shared feature—both Chevron and the rest of the
statutory interpretation rules rest on an outmoded, ―Schoolhouse Rock!‖
understanding of Congress and agencies that is no more, if it ever was.
Thirty years of Chevron thus reveal a statutory law–landscape in
remarkable flux, and a Court making few connections between the closely
linked administrative and statutory domains.
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INTRODUCTION
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.1 is best
known as a key rule of administrative law, but it is also a vital doctrine of
statutory interpretation. Like most other interpretive doctrines, Chevron
instructs courts how to resolve statutory ambiguity and, for that reason,
Chevron rightfully occupies a central place in the legislation canon. At the
same time, however, Chevron operates very differently from virtually all of
the other statutory interpretation rules. Those differences, and what they
tell us about the current state of the law of the statutory age, are the focus of
this Essay.
Consider the following distinctions between Chevron and the rest of the
statutory interpretation rules. Chevron is more of a ―doctrine‖ than the
other interpretive principles. It is more hinged to the realities of how
Congress drafts. Its application also has forced the U.S. Supreme Court to
grapple explicitly with hard questions about the role of judicial stare decisis
in statutory cases and, more generally, about the role of courts in the
modern regulatory era—questions that hover, still unanswered, over the
remaining rules of construction. And yet, Chevron is inextricably—perhaps
ill-fatedly—linked to these other rules, because Chevron‘s own doctrinal
test requires the courts to consider them in every Chevron inquiry.
These differences and connections—illuminated when one analyzes
Chevron from a legislation, rather than from an administrative law,
perspective—productively reveal some of the most important and
unanswered questions of the statutory era. Specifically, this Essay focuses
on six doctrinal and theoretical intersections:
First, Chevron is a ―precedent,‖ whereas the other canons of statutory
interpretation are not treated as precedent or ―doctrine‖ of any kind. Instead
their legal status remains entirely ambiguous. These other canons help to
decide cases but are not treated as ―law.‖ Instead, they often are referred to
as mere ―rules of thumb.‖
Second, Chevron itself exposes the contingency of those other canons, in
Chevron‘s own reliance on them in its famous two-step test. Under
Chevron, courts must use ―traditional tools of statutory construction‖2 to
determine if the statute is sufficiently clear to deprive agencies of
interpretive leeway. Law reviews are clogged with criticisms of courts‘
inconsistent approaches to this first-step inquiry, but the fault arguably lies
with the wishy-washiness not of Chevron, but of those canons on which
Chevron relies and whose fickle applications have been chronicled at least
since Karl Llewellyn‘s famous exposition.3
Third, Chevron embraces legislative realism and also has grappled with
its own jurisprudential foundations in ways that other canons do not and
1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. Id. at 843 n.9.
3. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950)
(chronicling that for every canon there is a counter-canon that contradicts it).
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have not. Although the Court announced Chevron with a hodgepodge of
justifications that ranged from congressional intent to agency expertise,4 the
Court over the last decade, beginning in United States v. Mead Corp.,5 has
explicitly re-grounded Chevron in congressional intent.6 Also in Mead, the
Court embarked on a new effort to make delegation doctrine more
―realistic,‖ that is, more linked to how Congress actually works and how
Congress itself signals delegation.7
In contrast, outside of the
administrative deference context, the Court has shown virtually no interest
in linking how Congress really works to the rest of its interpretive doctrines
and has been content to leave the jurisprudential bases of those doctrines
imprecisely defined.
Fourth, Chevron is the one instance in which the Court has explicitly
used interpretive doctrines to influence the procedures that Congress uses.
In Mead, the Court effectively told Congress that if it wants Chevron
deference for its agencies, it has to delegate with formal process, and that
agencies must use those processes rather than announce administrative
interpretations more informally.8 Again in contrast, across the rest of the
statutory interpretation landscape, the Court has refused to enter the sausage
factory, continuing to reject the idea of ―due process of lawmaking‖—i.e.,
that how a law is made should affect its legitimacy or how it is interpreted
by courts.9
Fifth, Chevron has been at the center of a robust debate about statutory
stare decisis. That debate has highlighted deep tensions in how the Court
conceives of precedent more generally in the statutory context, and also
evinces the Court still struggling to define its role in the modern statutory
era. Chevron, of course, worked an enormous transfer of interpretive
authority from courts to agencies. But the Court went even further in
National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
Services,10 a 2005 decision that effectively liberates agencies from stare
decisis for their own interpretations in many cases and even allows agency
interpretation of ambiguous statutes to displace judicial precedents on those
same questions.11 At the very same time, the Court has continued to use
other doctrines of statutory precedent to enhance its power over other
institutional actors, perhaps in reaction to all it has given away through the
Chevron line of cases. For instance, the Court applies ―super strong stare

4. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864–65.
5. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
6. See id. at 236–37.
7. Id. (narrowing Chevron‘s availability to those situations in which Congress has
signaled an intent to delegate and in so doing seeking to ―tailor deference to [the] variety‖ of
ways in which Congress delegates).
8. Id. at 226–27.
9. Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 199 (1976); cf.
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN ET AL., ―DUE PROCESS OF LAWMAKING‖: UNITED STATES,
SOUTHERN AFRICA, GERMANY, AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, (forthcoming 2014) (describing
the lack of a ―due process of lawmaking‖ doctrine in American statutory law).
10. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
11. Id. at 984–86.
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decisis‖ to its own substantive statutory precedents,12 making them more
deeply entrenched than ordinary decisions. The Court also refuses to treat
statutory interpretation principles as formal precedents, a choice that
prevents Congress (or anyone else) from having any control over the canons
of interpretation.13
Sixth—and this is a parallel more than a difference—for all that
commends Chevron, it still is almost as outdated as the rest of statutory
interpretation doctrine. Chevron is based on a ―Schoolhouse Rock!‖
version of Congress that is no more, if it ever was. For example, Chevron
assumes that Congress delegates to one federal agency at a time, when in
fact Congress often delegates to multiple agencies simultaneously, not all of
which are federal.14 Chevron also assumes that congressional drafters are
focused on the Court‘s own doctrines, when in fact the realities of the
legislative process are now so complex that drafters are focused on a host of
other factors—including agencies—that have little to do with courts (if they
ever did in the first place).15
In the end, viewing statutory interpretation in light of thirty years of
Chevron reveals the federal courts still finding their way, and still working
out the nature of statutory law in the modern legal era. We do not yet know
what kind of precedential weight statutory interpretation doctrines carry, or
whether they will ever be more determinate. We do not yet have a clear set
of foundations for the non-Chevron rules of construction themselves, but
what we can say is that if they are supposed to reflect how Congress drafts,
the Court is not making much of an effort toward that goal. And perhaps
most fundamentally, we see the Court torn between giving more power to
agencies and hoarding it for itself. Can we blame it? After all, the role of
the federal courts would be dramatically diminished if the courts ceded
control over the world of statutes.
Each of these Chevron differences could be the subject of its own study,
and I have elaborated on aspects in other work.16 But considering them
12. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362
(1988); see, e.g., John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 (2008)
(adhering with ―special force‖ to a longstanding interpretation of a Court of Federal Claims
statute of limitations).
13. See generally Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation:
Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753 (2013).
14. See generally Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory
Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121
YALE L.J. 534 (2011). For a detailed exposition of modern deviations from the textbook
processes of both administrative law and statutory interpretation, see Abbe R. Gluck, Anne
Joseph O‘Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, U. PENN.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
15. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part
II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 767–69 (2014).
16. For work on the legal status of the canons, see Gluck, supra note 13; Abbe R. Gluck,
The States As Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the
New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, States As
Laboratories]. For work on Chevron‘s justifications and its legislative realism, see Abbe R.
Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical
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together, albeit in more summary fashion, has the advantage of constructing
a more holistic picture of the doctrines in flux, and what the next thirty
years of Chevron and the statutory landscape have in store.
I. CHEVRON AS A STUDY IN THE LEGAL STATUS
OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION METHODOLOGY
Chevron is a legal framework used by courts to resolve questions of
statutory ambiguity. Like all canons and presumptions of statutory
interpretation, Chevron is a rule that tips the scales in favor of a particular
result when a statute is unclear. In Chevron‘s case, the scales are tipped
toward the agency‘s preferred interpretation. So understood, it functions
much like any other canon of statutory interpretation, such as the
presumption that ambiguous statutes be construed as not preempting state
law (the ―presumption against preemption‖)17 or the presumption that
ambiguous statutory provisions be construed so as not to render other
statutory provisions redundant (the ―rule against superfluities‖).18
Administrative law experts sometimes resist this description of Chevron as
a ―canon‖: they think of Chevron as hard-core ―doctrine,‖ indeed, their
central doctrine, in ways that statutory interpretation canons are not often
understood.19 But Chevron‘s analogous role in resolving interpretive
disputes is why legislation experts understand Chevron (properly in my
view) as not only a central administrative law doctrine but also as another
tool in the judicial bucket of interpretive aids.20
This is not to say that Chevron is just any old interpretive tool. It is the
most cited administrative law case in history and has been referenced in
more than 7000 cases and more than 5000 law review articles.21 Congress
increasingly delegates more work to agencies and, as a result, the validity of
the ―agenc[ies‘] statutory interpretation‖22 is the main issue in an enormous
number of run-of-the-mill statutory interpretation cases.

Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901
(2013); Bressman & Gluck, supra note 15. For work on Chevron‘s outdated understanding
of how Congress drafts and delegates, see Gluck, supra note 14; Abbe R. Gluck, Our
[National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996 (2014); Gluck, O‘Connell & Po, supra note 14.
17. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
18. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687,
697–703 (1995) (refusing to construe the statute in ways that would give two statutory terms
duplicate meaning).
19. For statements to this effect from one of the leading administrative law textbooks,
see PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE‘S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND
COMMENTS 1021 (11th ed. 2011).
20. See Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron As a Canon, Not a
Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1727 (2010).
21. Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has
Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 782 & n.6 (2010);
see Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. Walker, Foreword: Chevron at 30: Looking Back and
Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 475 & n.2 (2014).
22. Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary
Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 524–26 (2005).
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Chevron, however, has an entirely different legal status from the other
interpretive principles. With the exception of Chevron and its progeny, the
Court does not apply what I have called ―methodological stare decisis‖—
the concept that judicial interpretive pronouncements (e.g., ―We presume
that Congress accords the same meaning to a term used multiple times
within the same statute‖) should be treated as precedential for the next
statutory case. This difference—Chevron‘s privileged status as real
―doctrine‖—lends jurisprudential clarity to Chevron that escapes the other
interpretive rules. Moreover, in contrast to most of the other interpretive
rules, there is widespread agreement about Chevron‘s source: the Court
created the doctrine. And so we know the nature of the power that
underlies it, and who can change it.
A. Only Chevron and Its Progeny Get Stare Decisis Effect
As I have detailed elsewhere, there is a conspicuous absence of any kind
of system of precedent for the entire non-administrative law–related
landscape of statutory interpretation methodology.23 For example, even
when a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court agrees on an interpretive
principle in a particular case (for example, ―floor statements are not reliable
legislative history‖ or the presumption that ambiguous bankruptcy statutes
be construed in favor of the debtor, and so on),24 that principle is not
viewed as ―law‖ for the next case, even when the same statute is being
construed. The Justices either believe that they cannot bind other Justices‘
(or future Justices‘) methodological choices or have implicitly concluded
that it would not be wise to do so.25 Instead, courts and scholars routinely
refer to these canons as ―universal‖ principles, or ―rules of thumb,‖26 a
sharp divergence from the way in which they treat analogous decisionmaking principles in other contexts—including choice-of-law rules, rules of
contract interpretation, and even constitutional law decision-making
regimes such as the tiers of scrutiny.
All of the canons except Chevron and its progeny, that is. Chevron is
routinely referred to as a ―precedent‖ by courts and scholars alike,27 and, as
noted, it is one of the most cited cases in history.28 Indeed, Chevron is a
precedent that was modified by another precedent (i.e., Mead) that was

23. See Gluck, States As Laboratories, supra note 16.
24. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
app. B (4th ed. 2007) (cataloguing more than 100 canons and citing references).
25. Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology As ―Law‖ and
the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1910 (2011).
26. Conn. Nat‘l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992) (―[C]anons of construction
are no more than rules of thumb . . . .‖); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory
Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 662 (1990); Philip P. Frickey, Revisiting the Revival
of Theory in Statutory Interpretation: A Lecture in Honor of Irving Younger, 84 MINN. L.
REV. 199, 206 (1999). See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012).
27. See generally Raso & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 20.
28. Id. at 1730–31; Beermann, supra note 21, at 782 & n.6.
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modified by yet another precedent (i.e., Brand X). The ―Chevron doctrine‖
as we talk about it today (and as I shall refer to it here) encompasses all of
these decisions, each building upon the other. Nothing like this exists with
respect to the rest of the interpretive doctrines. The Court has not, for
example, stated that the rule against superfluities applies only in a particular
class of situations (say, short versus long statutes or to a particular statute),
and then applied that precedent to the next case, much less built on it with
another doctrine.29
The Court has no ranking of these other canons and no other process that
determines in what order they will be applied or when. As another
example, the Court still has not decided—even though it has repeatedly
debated the question—whether legislative history may be consulted to
clarify a statute before applying a policy canon like the rule of lenity30 or
constitutional avoidance.31 Just this past Term, the Court divided again in
two high profile cases over the question of what threshold level of
ambiguity is necessary to trigger the application of two of the most
common interpretive presumptions—the federalism canon, in Bond v.
United States,32 and lenity, in Abramski v. United States.33 We have seen
these debates before,34 and it is virtually assured we will see them again,
because of the absence of methodological stare decisis.
B. Why Chevron’s Status As ―Real Law‖ Matters
It is a matter of highly contested opinion whether there should be
methodological stare decisis for principles of statutory construction.35 I
29. There may be some emerging exceptions. Most notably, the ―extraterritoriality
canon‖—the presumption that U.S. laws do not apply abroad unless the statute explicitly so
provides, see Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)—in recent years
seems to have taken on the status of something closer to a precedential rule than a
presumption of statutory interpretation. The rare progression from canon to precedent is
worthy of separate examination, which I develop in a forthcoming work.
30. Compare, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 429 (2009), with id. at 436–37
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the statutory ambiguity required applying the rule of
lenity, rather than ―comb[ing] through obscure legislative history‖).
31. Compare, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697 (2001), with id. at 706–07
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (debating the level of ambiguity required to trigger the canon of
constitutional avoidance).
32. 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). Compare id. at 2090, with id. at 2094–97 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment) (debating the level of ambiguity necessary to trigger the federalism
canon).
33. 134 S. Ct. 2259 (2014). Compare id. at 2272 n.10, with id. at 2280–81 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (debating whether the rule of lenity should have been applied before resorting
first to statutory purpose and history to clarify ambiguity).
34. Compare Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 410–11 (2010), with id. at 423–34
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (debating whether the rule of
lenity and avoidance canons could narrow an unconstitutionally broad criminal statute). See
Hayes, 555 U.S. at 429, 436–37 (summarized supra note 30).
35. See Gluck, supra note 13, at 778. Some view statutory interpretation as not a
―science‖ but an ―art,‖ and so as requiring a more creative judicial decision-making process
than other areas of law. Cf. generally Jerome Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on
Statutory Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1259, 1269 (1947) (comparing interpreting
legislation to interpreting music and addressing ―judges‘ reluctance to admit their own
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have argued elsewhere that some species of methodological stare decisis
might ameliorate the lack of predictability associated with statutory
interpretation.36 At a minimum, and regardless of how the stare decisis
question is resolved, canons must have some legal status. If they aren‘t
precedent or ―law,‖ what are they? It is difficult to think of any other rules
that do so much work in judicial opinions37 whose legal status remains so
ambiguous. Perhaps even more surprising, the Court does not seem at all
interested in acknowledging this ambiguity, much less in resolving it.
One significant aspect of Chevron‘s clear legal status is that it dispels a
common ―impossibility thesis‖—the argument that it is simply not possible
to doctrinalize interpretive rules. (State courts across the country have in
fact doctrinalized many of the canons, and state legislatures have even
passed laws about them, two developments that further dispel this
hypothesis.38)
Another significance of the Chevron difference is that judges and
scholars are not evasive about ―where the rule comes from‖ as they indeed
are with respect to the other canons. Administrative law scholars routinely
argue that much of administrative law, with a particular focus on Chevron,
is judge-made common law.39 In contrast, when it comes to the other
canons, courts suggest that they come from Blackstone,40 from ―common
sense,‖ or from reflections of how Congress legislates (but reflections
observed or originated by whom, no one says).41 The federal courts
generally do not acknowledge that courts create at least some canons in the
same way that courts created Chevron. Yet, the presumption against
preemption was announced in a New Deal–era case, Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp.42 in 1947. The federalism canon was announced in 1991 in
Gregory v. Ashcroft.43 Similarly, policy canons like the rule that
exemptions to the tax code are narrowly construed did not come down from
creativeness‖); Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 527, 528 (1947); Todd D. Rakoff, Statutory Interpretation As a Multifarious
Enterprise, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1559, 1578 (2010). Many believe that judges must retain
special interpretive flexibility in this context, and that belief may explain why most
commentators seem content to rest with the nebulous nature of the canons‘ legal status. It is
worth pointing out, however, that this romanticized vision of the judicial role in statutory
interpretation is a vision that is somewhat at odds with the positivism embraced by Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and its doctrinal progeny; namely, the idea
that law does not come from nowhere.
36. Gluck, States As Laboratories, supra note 16, at 1846–55.
37. At least in terms of justification; the canons‘ actual effect on judicial decision
making is difficult to determine and contested.
38. See generally Gluck, States As Laboratories, supra note 16 (detailing these state
developments).
39. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Common Law and Statute Law in Administrative Law,
63 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2011); Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common
Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (2012).
40. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 29 (1997) (emphasizing
the ―sheer antiquity‖ of lenity as a fact that justifies its application).
41. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 16, at 924–26.
42. 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
43. 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991).
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the sky, either.44 Aren‘t at least some of these canons as much ―common
law‖ as Chevron? To be sure, one might argue that they are more than
common law: for example, that canons invoking constitutional principles
like federalism are actually constitutional law, or constitutionally derived
―constitutional common law.‖45 The point is that, although we might divide
over which category of ―law‖ they are, they cannot really be ―not law‖ at
all.46
In my view, the judicial resistance to acknowledging the common law
status of these canons stems in large part from the consequences that would
be attendant to such an acknowledgment. If the canons were understood as
common law, they might bind other judges (meaning there would, indeed
be, methodological stare decisis)—or, even worse (from the viewpoint of
some judges), give Congress the power to legislate over them. In fact,
scholars have so assumed that Congress could legislate some different
version of Chevron.47 When it comes to the non-Chevron canons, however,
judges have vigorously resisted the idea that legislatures can dictate the
rules of statutory interpretation48—a position that almost certainly comes
both from a judicial desire to retain control over these cases and also from a
sense that these canons are somehow more ―internal‖ or personal to the
individual judge than ordinary decision-making rules.
One question to ask is why courts have so comfortably viewed Chevron
as different. It may be that more formality is necessary in the Chevron
context because the administrative deference doctrines explicitly regulate
interbranch relationships. Or it may be that deference doctrines are a
distinctly modern animal—created by modern courts to respond to the rise
of the administrative state, whereas some (but certainly not all) of the other
canons have applied to judicial decision making since Roman times, and
many more were inherited from the English common law tradition. These
older doctrines may be more poorly tailored to the modern statutory age
state than is Chevron.
The distinction may also stem from the fact that Chevron functions
slightly differently from the typical canon of statutory construction: it does
not aim to construe language, which is, perhaps, an inherently indeterminate
task that requires some interpretive flexibility. Rather, Chevron simply
44. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 24, app. B at 41 (citing United
States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring in judgment)); see also United
States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 357 (1988).
45. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword:
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV 1, 2–3 (1975).
46. Some of these canons, like the rule of lenity, may have constitutional bases but, as I
detailed in Gluck, supra note 13, that argument certainly cannot be made for all of them.
47. See generally Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2637
(2003); cf. Kent Barnett, Improving Agencies’ Preemption Expertise with Chevmore
Codification, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 587 (2014) (detailing how Congress legislated Skidmore,
rather than Chevron, deference for certain administrative preemption decisions in the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A) (2012)).
48. See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 26, at 245 (disputing the constitutionality of
legislated interpretive rules). See generally Gluck, States As Laboratories, supra note 16
(chronicling state court resistance to legislated interpretive rules).
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dictates the decider. Chevron‘s kind of institutional allocation rule (very
similar to how the Erie doctrine allocates decision-making authority
between state and federal courts49) may be more amenable to formalization
than rules that go to the meaning of language.
One punch line of this exposition, then, is that it may not be the inherent
legal status of the canons of interpretation that is the problem; rather, it may
be their substance. What if, e.g., the presumption against preemption,
instead of functioning as a principle of linguistic construction, functioned
instead to shift the interpretation of an ambiguous statute to the states‘
discretion? The rule of lenity is an interesting example in this regard.
Lenity does effectively shift the decision to the criminal defendant: the
presumption is that ambiguous criminal laws are interpreted in favor of
defendants. It may be no surprise then, in light of the foregoing discussion,
that judges tend to describe lenity in more ―lawlike‖ terms than they tend to
describe the other canons of interpretation. Many scholars consider lenity
closer to a ―doctrine‖ (perhaps even a doctrine of constitutional law) than a
―canon.‖50 Justice Scalia has so defended its legitimacy on several
occasions.51
II. CHEVRON AS A STUDY IN THE CONTINGENCY
OF THE REST OF THE CANONS
But even as it differs from the other canons, Chevron‘s fate, in an
important sense, rests on them: Chevron and the other canons of
interpretation are inextricably linked through Chevron‘s own formulation.
Chevron‘s famous two-step provides:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. [n.9] If, however, the court
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at
issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency‘s
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 52

As to the ascertainment of ambiguity, the opinion‘s also famous footnote
9 sets out how judges are to go about their task: ―If a court, employing
49. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the
Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2610 (2006) (―Chevron is our Erie, and much of the time, it is
emphatically the province and duty of the executive branch to say what the law is.‖).
50. John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
399, 406 n.26 (2010) (―[Lenity] ‗reflects not merely a convenient maxim of statutory
construction,‘ but rather ‗is rooted in fundamental principles of due process which mandate
that no individual be forced to speculate, at peril of indictment, whether his conduct is
prohibited.‘‖ (quoting Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112 (1979))).
51. See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 26, at 296–97.
52. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)
(footnotes omitted unless indicated).
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traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an
intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must
be given effect.‖53
Chevron tells courts to defer to reasonable agency statutory
interpretations if the statute is ambiguous, but it also tells courts that they
first should attempt to resolve any ambiguities themselves using the
―traditional tools of statutory construction.‖ The problem, however—which
relates directly to the absence of general methodological stare decisis
described in the previous part—is that the Court never sets out what those
―traditional tools‖ are, likely because it could not agree on them if it wanted
to.
The result is that Chevron has become a punching bag for those who
argue that courts are result-oriented in their approach to agency deference.
William Eskridge and Connor Raso go so far as to challenge the idea that
Chevron is a precedent in the first place because Chevron and its sister
administrative deference doctrines are so inconsistently applied.54
Nevertheless, the administrative law canons do have an effective
―ranking‖—we know, e.g., that Curtiss-Wright deference (on national
security matters)55 is stronger than Chevron, which is stronger than
Skidmore,56 and so on. On the other hand, we know little about whether the
presumption against preemption is stronger than the presumption against
implied repeals.
These uncertainties about the relationships among the non-Chevron
canons play out in the Chevron cases themselves. The Court is divided
about whether legislative history should be used to eliminate statutory
ambiguity (and so preclude agency deference under Chevron), or whether
policy-based canons like preemption might do so,57 and so the federal
courts are generally inconsistent in their use of such canons at Step One.
These disputes give Chevron a bad name, but understanding the statutory
interpretation landscape makes clear that the disputes are not really about
Chevron. Rather, they reflect a lack of consensus on the Court about the
other interpretive tools, even in the absence of an agency interpretation in
the case.
The Court rests Chevron‘s application on a finding of ―ambiguity‖ but
has directed jurists to make that ambiguity determination with reference to a

53. Id. at 843 n.9 (emphasis added).
54. See generally Raso & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 20.
55. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
56. Skidmore, which preceded Chevron, was not the same kind of power-transferring
deference doctrine as Chevron. In Skidmore, the Court held that agency statutory
interpretations should be given weight in accordance with their ―power to persuade,‖ but the
courts retained ultimate interpretive authority. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,
140 (1944).
57. See generally Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of
Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64 (2008). For example, if a statute is
ambiguous with respect to preemption, the question is whether to defer to the agency‘s view
under Chevron or ―clarify‖ the statute by applying the default no-preemption rule, thereby
depriving the agency of discretion on that question.
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category of legal tools—―traditional tools of statutory construction‖—that
is murky at best, because the Court cannot agree on what the traditional
tools of construction are, or in what order they should be applied, and
because the Court will not treat any decision on such matters as carrying
any kind of stare decisis effect. Don‘t blame Chevron. Blame the lack of
methodological consensus in the federal courts when it comes to the rest of
the interpretive principles.
III. CHEVRON AS A STUDY IN LEGISLATIVE REALISM
AND JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS
Chevron and its progeny also radically differ from the other canons with
respect to how very explicitly the Court has grappled with Chevron‘s basis
and goals in ways it has not for the other presumptions. This jurisprudential
struggle has resulted in a Chevron approach that is now much more focused
on how Congress actually works than is typical for the rest of the statutory
interpretation rules.
A. There Is No Coherent Jurisprudential Basis for the Canons of
Interpretation Outside of the Chevron Line of Cases
Outside of the Chevron context, judges have justified the application of
the canons on numerous and often conflicting grounds, all generally
grouped under the very large umbrella concept that courts should act as
―faithful agents‖ of the legislature.58 This has translated to arguments that
the canons are legitimate because they (1) reflect how Congress drafts (e.g.,
the rule against superfluities); (2) help Congress draft better (e.g., the
presumption against preemption); (3) are part of a shared set of background
principles of which courts and Congress are each aware and mutually apply
(e.g., clear statement rules); (4) impose beneficial, sometimes
constitutional, policy norms on the legislative process (e.g., the rule of
lenity); or (5) serve a ―rule of law‖ function (in the sense that they advance
values of coherence, predictability, and notice (e.g., the presumption that
statutory terms are used consistently throughout the U.S. Code).59
Obviously not all of these functions are the same. The claim that
interpretive doctrines should merely reflect how Congress drafts posits a
very different role for the judiciary than a claim that interpretive doctrines
should aim to change congressional behavior or even impose values (like
consistency or federalism) on legislation that Congress itself does not. Nor
has the Court disaggregated the individual canons and justified different
canons on different grounds—for example, perhaps canons based on the
Constitution do not require congressional awareness or use to be legitimate.
Moreover, many of these justifications for the canons are based on
empirical claims: the idea that canons reflect how Congress actually drafts
and that the canons set out ―clear statements‖ that Congress knows to use
58. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 16, at 913 (collecting sources).
59. For a more detailed discussion and examples from cases, see Gluck & Bressman,
supra note 16, at 979–82.
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are claims about the real world of legislative drafting, and yet the Court
does not seem at all interested in verifying the accuracy of these
assumptions. Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner recently published a 500page treatise discussing more than seventy individual canons, including
their bases in legislative drafting, without presenting any evidence of the
actual federal statutory drafting process.60
B. Contrast the Progression from Chevron to Mead, and the Move Toward
Legislative Realism in the Deference Context
Enter Chevron. It is true that Chevron, like the rest of the statutory
interpretation canons, initially rested on a variety of not necessarily
consistent normative bases. The Chevron opinion itself set out a range of
justifications for its new rule—justifications that extended from agencies‘
superior political accountability to the notion that Congress actually intends
to delegate to agencies whenever statutes are ambiguous or silent.61 In the
years after Chevron, the broad consensus was that Chevron‘s intent-based
presumption—that any statutory ambiguity or silence signals congressional
intent to delegation—was a fiction, although, to some, a benign one.62
Then came Mead, in which the Court expressly grappled with whether
Congress actually intends to delegate whenever a statute is ambiguous or
silent. The Court answered that question in the negative, and in the process
significantly narrowed the Chevron presumption of delegation to apply only
when Congress gives agencies formal lawmaking authority (and agencies
use that authority).63
One way to understand the march from Chevron to Mead is as an
evolution from a broad and ambiguously justified approach to delegation to
one focused on one particular justification—congressional intent to
delegate—grounded in legislative reality. Justice Souter‘s majority opinion
in Mead begins with a recital of the many different ways in which Congress
includes agencies in federal statutes and the many different ways in which
agencies exercise the power that Congress gives them. In Justice Souter‘s
words, Mead is the Court‘s effort to ―tailor deference to [the] variety‖ of
ways in which Congress delegates.64 So understood, Mead makes two
critical moves: (1) it realistically acknowledges that Congress designs
statutory roles for agencies in myriad ways that a single interpretive
presumption cannot capture, and (2) it argues that courts should try to
reflect congressional practice, even if it comes in this variety of forms.
Then-professors Barron and Kagan described Mead‘s holding as one that
60. See generally SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 26.
61. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66
(1984).
62. See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of
Congressional Delegation, 97 VA. L. REV. 2009 (2011).
63. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (―We hold that
administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron
deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make
rules carrying the force of law . . . .‖).
64. Id. at 236.
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firmly and exclusively grounds Chevron in congressional intent, calling it
―the apotheosis of a developing trend in Chevron cases: the treatment of
Chevron as a congressional choice, rather than either a constitutional
mandate or a judicial doctrine.‖65
Return to the non-administrative law canons and consider how the
Chevron-to-Mead doctrinal evolution exposes the flimsiness of their own
jurisprudential bases. Judges have not told us which interpretive doctrines
must be pegged to congressional intent to be legitimate, nor have they
acknowledged the dizzying variety in how Congress drafts. As my recent
empirical study of congressional drafting with Lisa Bressman details,66
omnibus and non-omnibus statutes are very different animals (for example,
legislative history and consistent-word usage play different roles in each).
Statutes drafted by a single committee are different from statutes drafted by
leadership or multiple committees acting together. Appropriations statutes
are different from authorization statutes, and so on. Even the subject matter
makes a difference, in the view of the drafting staff, with respect to what
presumptions and drafting practices congressional drafters apply. It may
not be possible, or desirable, to craft an interpretive regime that actually
reflects the complexities of this real-world drafting process. But the point is
that, in the Chevron context, the Court has worn these questions on its
sleeve. The Chevron-to-Mead doctrinal evolution has occasioned a
vigorous public debate in the Court (mostly between Justices Breyer and
Souter on the one side and Justice Scalia on the other) about how much
doctrine should or does reflect congressional practice; how much
complexity the system will tolerate; and the costs and benefits of tailored or
transsubstantive interpretive rules67—questions that have long lurked far
beneath the surface for the rest of statutory interpretation doctrine.
C. The Court Is Doing a Better Job Approximating
How Congress Works with the Administrative Canons
It therefore may come as little surprise that the Court seems to be doing a
better job approximating how Congress delegates than approximating how
Congress drafts. The Gluck-Bressman study surveyed 137 congressional
counsels on their familiarity with the judicial doctrines of interpretation and
delegation and on whether the doctrines (regardless of staffer familiarity
with them) substantially reflected the realities of the legislative drafting
process.68 As we detailed, congressional staffers knew few of the nonadministrative law canons of statutory interpretation and rejected several
65. David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT.
REV. 201, 212.
66. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 16, at 979–82; Bressman & Gluck, supra note
15, at 758–61.
67. See, e.g., Mead, 533 U.S. at 236 (―If the primary objective is to simplify the judicial
process of giving or withholding deference, then the diversity of statutes authorizing
discretionary administrative action must be declared irrelevant or minimized. . . . Justice
Scalia‘s first priority over the years has been to limit and simplify. The Court‘s choice has
been to tailor deference to variety.‖).
68. See Bressman & Gluck, supra note 15; Gluck & Bressman, supra note 16.
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that they did know (such as presumptions of consistent-term usage) as
unrealistic assumptions about congressional drafting.69
The administrative law canons, however, fared better. For example, the
rule announced in Mead, although the case was virtually unknown by name
or as a doctrine that courts employ, was overwhelmingly validated as a
good signal on which to rest assumptions about congressional delegation.
Chevron was the most known of all the canons by name, and the majority
of respondents said they understood Chevron‘s consequences when
drafting. Even some of the less generally known and hotly contested
administrative law doctrines, such as the major questions rule (i.e., do not
presume from mere ambiguity that Congress delegates major economic,
policy, or political statements to agencies70), were validated by our
respondents as realistic assumptions about delegation.71
Why the Court seems to have done a better job in the administrative law
context is a difficult question about which one can only hypothesize. The
current Court is packed with administrative law scholars, former D.C.
Circuit judges, and former executive branch officials. Only Justice Breyer
has worked in the legislative branch, and there has not been a Justice on the
Court who served in Congress since Justice Black retired in 1971. As noted
in Part I, it also seems relevant that the administrative law doctrines have
been developed hand in hand with the regulatory state itself, in contrast to
the ancient, ―cookie-cutter‖ rules of general interpretation.
Regardless of the reason, Mead‘s apparently successful attempt to
incorporate some realistic legislative signaling into interpretive doctrine
challenges the Court either to do better when it comes to the rest of the
canons, or to justify why it chooses not to do so. One can see why the
Court likes to say that all of its canons aim to reflect congressional practice:
such an approach has obvious democratic legitimacy and legislative
supremacy attractions. What is more, to say that the canons merely reflect
what Congress does is to say that the Court does not make them up—and I
detailed in Part I the Court‘s strong resistance to acknowledging that the
canons are judicially derived.
But if the canons do not actually reflect congressional practice, then the
Court needs to acknowledge where they are coming from (the Court?) and
what they are doing. There are good arguments to be made, for example,
that federal courts should interpret statutes to be internally consistent even
if Congress did not so intend—such an approach to statutory interpretation
would rest on the importance of public notice or on the federal courts‘ role
in cohering the corpus juris.72 Likewise, there are arguments to be made in
69. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 16, at 906, 924–64.
70. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994).
71. See Bressman & Gluck, supra note 15, at 990–1014; cf. Christopher J. Walker,
Chevron Inside the Regulatory State: An Empirical Assessment, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 703,
715–21 (2014) (finding similar understandings among agency personnel surveyed on many
of the same questions utilized by Gluck and Bressman).
72. See Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 133 S. Ct. 735, 744 (2013) (―Consistency of
interpretation of related state and federal laws is a virtue in that it helps to create simplicity
making the law easier to understand and to follow for lawyers and for nonlawyers alike.‖);
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support of courts interpreting statutes against the backdrop of
constitutionally derived values, like federalism and lenity, that Congress
might not have sufficiently considered. The point is not to criticize these
alternate approaches, but rather to press the Court to be clear about what
should justify modern interpretive practice, as the Court has tried to do in
the context of delegation.
IV. CHEVRON AS A STUDY IN ―DUE PROCESS OF LAWMAKING‖ (AND AS
AN END RUN AROUND VERMONT YANKEE)
Ever since 1892, when the Court held in Field v. Clark73 that, ―an
enrolled act, thus authenticated, is sufficient evidence of itself . . . that it
passed Congress,‖74 federal courts have refused to enter the sausage
factory. That is, they have refused to consider whether Congress engages in
―due process of lawmaking‖—for example, whether Congress was
sufficiently deliberate or transparent in the enactment of legislation—in
evaluating a statute‘s legitimacy or its meaning.75 This position has
arguably taken on greater significance in recent years, as extreme
congressional gridlock has occasioned a rise of what political scientist
Barbara Sinclair calls ―unorthodox lawmaking‖—the increased use of
legislative maneuvers such as closed-door summits and omnibus (bundled)
legislation that make the legislative process less transparent and result in
statutes that can be quite messy even as they increase in complexity.76
A. Mead, However, Is a Due Process of Lawmaking Decision
But here, again, Chevron provides an exception. Mead, although not
commonly conceptualized in this fashion, is a ―due process of lawmaking‖
decision when considered from the perspective of statutory interpretation
doctrine. In Mead, the Court effectively told Congress that if it wants
deference for an agency delegate, the agency must be given the power to
make law through the transparent and deliberative notice-and-comment

Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment) (―The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined . . . on the
basis of which meaning is . . . most compatible with the surrounding body of law into which
the provision must be integrated . . . .‖); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 26, at 252 (―[T]he
body of the law should make sense, and . . . it is the responsibility of the courts, within the
permissible meanings of the text, to make it so.‖); Elizabeth Garrett, Attention to Context in
Statutory Interpretation: Applying the Lessons of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation to
Omnibus Legislation, ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, art. 1, 2002, at 7, available at
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art1 (subscription required). See generally William W.
Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 171
(2000) (elaborating on Justice Scalia‘s views of the judicial obligation to impose coherence
on the U.S. Code).
73. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
74. Id. at 672.
75. See generally Linde, supra note 9.
76. See generally BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE
PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (4th ed. 2012); Gluck, O‘Connell & Po, supra note 14.
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process provided by the Administrative Procedure Act.77 And the agency
has to use it. As Justice Scalia commented in his Mead dissent, if the Court
were concerned only with finding a clear signal of congressional intent to
delegate, then looking for the delegation of lawmaking power from
Congress would have been enough.78 Requiring the agency to use that
power adds something more to the Mead opinion.
The Court in Mead was adding something that it had not felt comfortable
doing as a matter of constitutional law in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.79 In Vermont Yankee, the
Court held that it was beyond the power of the federal courts to add
procedural requirements to agency statutory implementation beyond the
requirements set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act.80 Mead,
however, accomplishes close to the same result in a more indirect fashion,
encouraging agencies to use formal procedures if they want their
interpretations to get deference. The question is why, here too, the Court
seems more willing to grapple with the same ideas in the Chevron
context—in this case, ideas about which policymaking procedures produce
more legitimate outcomes—that it continues to avoid when it comes to the
rest of the canons.
B. Mead (Like Some Other Canons) As ―Backdoor‖ Constitutional Law
We also see in Mead the Court trying to affect congressional behavior
through the ―softer‖ mode of regulatory law in ways that it does not feel
comfortable doing through the sharper edge of constitutional doctrine.
Thus conceptualized, Mead bears resemblance to how some scholars have
described the Court‘s use of certain other interpretive rules, most
prominently, the statutory interpretation ―clear statement rules.‖ Clear
statement rules require from Congress what are essentially magic words
before courts will interpret statutes to tread on constitutional values—for
example, the requirement that Congress must be explicit when it wishes to
abrogate sovereign immunity or intrude on traditional state functions.81 As
William Eskridge and Philip Frickey have put it, the Court has used these
rules to make ―backdoor‖ constitutional law in precisely those areas in
which the Court has decided, as a constitutional matter, it should not
intervene.82
This comparison to clear statement rules makes even clearer that Mead is
an end run around Vermont Yankee. The Court accomplished through
interpretive doctrine what it could not accomplish through constitutional
77. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); see also Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (describing the notice and public comment procedures
required for federal rulemaking).
78. Mead, 533 U.S. at 246 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
80. Id. at 543.
81. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
82. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules As Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 598 (1992).
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law, much in the same way that the Court‘s creation of a new ―federalism‖
clear statement rule in Gregory v. Ashcroft83 offered the states the
protection from congressional intrusion that the Court had held, just six
years earlier, the Constitution could not offer.84
And, in return, Mead highlights the due-process-of-lawmaking features
of the other canons of interpretation. Consider again the clear statement
rules, which generally have not been conceptualized as a due-process-oflawmaking regime. A Court concerned that Congress is not sufficiently
deliberative when it comes to, e.g., decisions of federal-state relations,
might address that concern by creating an extra legislative hurdle—a
requirement of a clear statutory statement for any statutory change to the
federalism status quo—to make Congress pause or encourage explicit
debate on the subject. Like Mead, and in light of Mead, such presumptions
look much more like judicial attempts to affect the lawmaking process,
despite the Court‘s stated resistance to doing anything of the sort.
V. CHEVRON AS A STUDY IN SUBSTANTIVE STATUTORY PRECEDENTS—
AND THE ROLE OF FEDERAL COURTS IN THE STATUTORY ERA
Chevron also has a lot to tell us about how the Court sees its role—and
how that role is changing—in the modern statutory state. One way to see
this is to look at the next major administrative deference case after Mead:
Brand X—a 2005 decision with enormous repercussions for the allocation
of power between courts and agencies.
A. Is the Court Really Ready to Give Away All of This Power?
In Brand X, the Supreme Court held that agency statutory interpretations
of ambiguous statutes sometimes could, and indeed should, displace judicial
precedents on what those statutes mean—perhaps even U.S. Supreme Court
precedents.85 This is a ―WOW‖ moment. Brand X is arguably the capstone
of the Court‘s Chevron evolution: it works a wholesale transfer of statutory
interpretation authority from federal courts to agencies. Not since the
famous Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins86 case have we seen the Court
giving away so much of its power to a different institutional legal actor.
Well before Brand X, Cass Sunstein already had called Chevron our
generation‘s Erie doctrine.87 When Erie was decided, at the dawn of the
83. 501 U.S. 452, 459–60 (1991).
84. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555–56 (1985).
85. Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982
(2005) (―A court‘s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for
agency discretion.‖).
86. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
87. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 206 (2006) (―Chevron can
be seen in this light as a close analogue to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins—as a suggestion
that law and interpretation often involve no ‗brooding omnipresence in the sky‘ but instead
discretionary judgments to be made by appropriate institutions.‖ (quoting S. Pac. Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting))).

626

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

New Deal era, it was state courts that received the transfer of law-deciding
power; in the modern era of the regulatory state, it is federal agencies.
Brand X, however, makes the Erie link even more explicit than Chevron
alone. As Kenneth Bamberger and Peter Strauss each have noted, just as
Erie held that state, not federal, courts have the final word on interpretations
of state law, the doctrine announced in Brand X effectively turns many
judicial statutory interpretations into ―provisional precedents‖: judicial
interpretations sit provisionally in place until an agency interpretation
displaces them.88
The big-picture question is whether, when it comes to statutory cases, the
Court is really comfortable giving away so much of the store. Erie took
away from courts similar swaths of power: most of the common law
landscape comes from the state-law doctrines that Erie told federal courts to
stop making themselves. But coming at the same time as the New Deal,
Erie simply cleared the federal courts‘ plate for an arguably even bigger
meal: the major statutes of the modern regulatory state. Today, by
contrast, no new area of federal law waits in the wings to fill the void left
by the transfer of federal statutory interpretation to agencies.
Unsurprisingly, the Court thus seems conflicted about the current state of
affairs—about its place, its powers, and the role of the federal courts in the
modern statutory world. The Court seems to be grappling with questions
about its own status and the status of the law that it makes in today‘s
regulatory state, and there is a tension between how much power the
Justices desire to give to agencies and how much they want to keep.
These tensions are on display when we look at the rest of the doctrinal
landscape of precedent in the statutory interpretation context. In a series of
opinions, the Court has emphasized that statutory interpretation opinions
get ―super strong stare decisis‖—a higher level of stare decisis than the
usual mode.89 The justification has generally rested on separation of
powers: once a court speaks on a statutory matter, it is up to Congress, in
the interest of legislative supremacy, to decide how to react.90 Some cases
also have emphasized reliance interests in support of super strong stare
decisis for statutory precedents, particularly when it comes to statutes
governing business, markets, or property.91 But, as Brand X illustrates,
88. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in
Administrative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272, 1310–11 (2002) (presaging Brand
X); Peter L. Strauss, ―Deference‖ Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them ―Chevron Space‖ and
―Skidmore Weight,‖ 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1169 (2012).
89. See, e.g., John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 (2008)
(―[S]tare decisis in respect to statutory interpretation has ‗special force‘ . . . .‖ (quoting
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989))); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S.
258, 280–82 (1972) (refusing to overrule several earlier cases involving baseball‘s
exemption from federal antitrust laws); Gluck, supra note 25, at 1917–18.
90. See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317, 327 (2005).
91. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. at 139 (reasoning in a statutory interpretation case that
―even if the Government cannot show detrimental reliance on our earlier cases, our
reexamination of well-settled precedent could nevertheless prove harmful‖ because ―[t]o
overturn a decision settling one such matter simply because we might believe that decision is
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when agencies are involved, the Court takes a completely different tack.
Brand X thus bifurcates the world of substantive statutory precedents:
agencies can change their minds and even effectively change some judgemade precedents whereas, for courts, their statutory precedents are ossified.
But the Court has not been able to go all the way. Many court watchers
read Brand X in shock. Would the United States Supreme Court really
allow a federal agency to overrule one of its own opinions? Justice Stevens
concurred specially (but alone) in Brand X to carve out an exception for the
Court‘s own precedents.92 Perhaps not surprisingly, when confronted
directly with that question in the next major case, United States v. Home
Concrete & Supply,93 the Court punted and so lived to fight another day.
B. Other Statutory Precedent Doctrines That Hoard Power for the Court
The Court has also engaged in more subtle attempts to retain interpretive
power. Many of the ways in which the Court deploys its own doctrines of
precedent in the statutory interpretation context, agencies aside, seem to be
attempts to retain a central role for courts. Consider in this regard the lack
of methodological stare decisis discussed in Part I; or the Court‘s stingy
treatment of congressional overrides of statutory decisions, which Deborah
Widiss has documented;94 or its retention of emphasis on the common law
(which of course is made by judges). Refusing to treat interpretive
methodology as law, for example, means that Congress can‘t overrule it.
Giving congressional overrides their narrowest construction retains as much
as possible of the previous judicial decision. Retaining a series of outdated
default presumptions that statutes are to be interpreted against the backdrop
of the common law and that when statutes are ambiguous the common law
principle controls is a last grasp at judicial power, as Justice Scalia and
Judge Posner each have charged.95

no longer ‗right‘ . . . could itself threaten to substitute disruption, confusion, and uncertainty
for necessary legal stability‖).
92. Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1003
(2005) (Stevens, J., concurring) (―While I join the Court‘s opinion in full, I add this caveat
concerning Part III-B, which correctly explains why a court of appeals‘ interpretation of an
ambiguous provision in a regulatory statute does not foreclose a contrary reading by the
agency. That explanation would not necessarily be applicable to a decision by this Court
that would presumably remove any pre-existing ambiguity.‖).
93. 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012). Home Concrete involved a pre-Chevron interpretation of a
tax statute by the Court that was later interpreted, post-Chevron, differently by the IRS. The
Court punted the question by holding that since the earlier case was pre-Chevron, the Court‘s
descriptions of the statutory ambiguity should not be taken in the official Chevron sense.
Instead, the Court held that had the earlier case come to the Court post-Chevron, the Court
would have held that the statute was not ambiguous, thereby leaving no room for the
alternate agency interpretation even if Brand X applied to the Supreme Court. See id. at
1843–44.
94. Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory
Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 518–28 (2009).
95. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 26, at 318 (calling this canon ―a relic of the
courts‘ historical hostility to the emergence of statutory law‖); SCALIA, supra note 40, at 29
(calling this canon a ―sheer judicial power-grab‖). Judge Posner also recently called the

628

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

Brand X of course tugs in the opposite direction, and we see the Court
struggling with the decision. Chief Justice Roberts‘s dissent in City of
Arlington v. FCC96—perhaps not un-coincidentally the first major
administrative deference case after Home Concrete—is one of the more
explicit statements of concern that the Court has been overly generous: ―It
would be a bit much to describe the result [of Chevron] as ‗the very
definition of tyranny,‘ but the danger posed by the growing power of the
administrative state cannot be dismissed.‖97
VI. CHEVRON AS A STUDY IN THE END OF ―SCHOOLHOUSE ROCK!‖
(OR, CHEVRON: THE NEXT THIRTY YEARS)
One thing Chevron does share with most other statutory interpretation
doctrines is ―Schoolhouse Rock!‖ Mead is an important exception—a
recognition that Congress delegates in a variety of complex and diverging
ways. But most other aspects of Chevron-Mead share with the nonadministrative interpretive doctrines the outdated assumption of a textbook
legislative process that rarely exists today, if it ever did. The doctrines
generally assume that statutes are drafted by a single or cohesive group of
people; that when there is a delegation it is to one, federal, agency; and that
statutes progress from committee, to floor, to vote, to conference just as the
cartoon taught us.
It‘s time to bid adieu to this old familiar tale—and that is a project not
only for Chevron‘s next thirty years but for the broader statutory context as
well. Sinclair has documented the rise of ―unorthodox lawmaking‖98—
pervasive deviations of the legislative process from the ―Schoolhouse
Rock!‖ model to, e.g., omnibus deals involving multiple congressional
committees; bills that sometimes bypass committee altogether in favor of
off-the-record summits between party leaders and the executive branch; and
countless other process deviations that I have further developed elsewhere,
with Anne Joseph O‘Connell and Rosa Po.99 The Gluck-Bressman
empirical study also confirms that congressional staff are acutely aware of
these changes and view them as having a significant impact both on how
statutes are drafted and on the tools that courts should use to interpret them.
For instance, common interpretive tools, like legislative history or
presumptions that statutes are drafted with internal coherence and
consistency of language, have more relevance in statutes with a linear

canon a ―fossil remnant of the traditional hostility of English judges to legislation.‖ Liu v.
Mund, 686 F.3d 418, 421 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Gluck, supra note 13, at 811.
96. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
97. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1879 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(quoting The FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961). Arlington
held that Chevron deference was available to agencies‘ interpretations of their own
jurisdiction—a question that the Court had hinted in earlier cases was one of those ―major
questions‖ that agencies should not be presumed to be delegated. Id. at 1868.
98. SINCLAIR, supra note 76.
99. See Gluck, O‘Connell & Po, supra note 14 (introducing six categories of unorthodox
lawmaking and analogous unorthodox administrative processes).
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process than in omnibus bills.100 But this real-world description has no legs
when it comes to the doctrines actually in play.
On the agency side, unorthodox lawmaking leads to what my coauthors
and I have called ―unorthodox delegations‖ and ―unorthodox
rulemaking.‖101 Statutes drafted by multiple committees often delegate, in
overlapping fashion, to multiple agencies precisely because each committee
wants its own agency in the game.102 Statutes that address particularly
controversial issues often punt difficult policy questions not only to federal
agencies but outside of the federal government entirely—to state
administrators and even private actors—thereby allowing the feds to deflect
some accountability.103 But there is no Chevron analogue for multiple
federal implementers,104 or for any implementers that are not federal
agencies,105 even though there is now some empirical evidence that
Congress sometimes intends to delegate to multiple implementers
simultaneously and even to outside entities like states.106 Nor have the
Chevron cases begun to consider how the rise of unorthodox rulemaking—
agencies‘ use of atypical and non-APA-derived policymaking practices—
should affect questions of administrative deference.107
Here, the Chevron context is simply one instance of the broader
phenomenon. As I have detailed elsewhere, for example, statutory
interpretation doctrine shares Chevron‘s federal-law myopia—the persistent
and incorrect assumption that the only actors who create and interpret
federal law are federal actors.108 But a challenge for the next thirty years of
Chevron (and the rest) is to find a way to capture—or to justify ignoring—
the overlapping complexity of the modern administrative state. For
example, in addition to the need for deference rules that take into account
multiple, nonfederal implementers (even if those rules ultimately reject
deference), one wonders how these other nuances of unorthodox lawmaking
100. Bressman & Gluck, supra note 15, at 758–63 (discussing the unorthodox lawmaking
procedures in legislation); Gluck & Bressman, supra note 16, at 936–37, 979–81 (detailing
unorthodox lawmaking‘s relevance).
101. See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O‘Connell, The Lost World of Administrative
Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137 (2014) (detailing how the textbook story of administrative law is
no more); Gluck, O‘Connell & Po, supra note 14; Rosa Po, Unorthodox Rulemaking
(unpublished note) (on file with author) (analogizing between rulemaking and Barbara
Sinclair‘s work on legislation).
102. See generally ROBERT KAISER, ACT OF CONGRESS: HOW AMERICA‘S ESSENTIAL
INSTITUTION WORKS, AND HOW IT DOESN‘T (2013) (describing how this phenomenon in the
context of Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation led to overlapping delegations between
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the Securities and Exchange
Commission). On the pervasiveness of overlapping federal delegations, see generally Jody
Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV.
1131 (2012).
103. Gluck, supra note 14, at 602–03.
104. Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law,
2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 207.
105. See generally Gluck, supra note 14.
106. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 16, at 1006–11 (describing respondents‘
understanding of delegation to multiple agencies and/or state implementers).
107. See Gluck, O‘Connell & Po, supra note 14.
108. Gluck, supra note 14, at 537–38, 551–64.
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affect delegation. For instance: Are agencies more attentive to differences
across statutes than are courts? Do agencies discount legislative history in
omnibus vehicles, as the Gluck-Bressman drafters suggested interpreters
should? (If so, where do agencies get their directives for such statutes,
since many agency directives currently appear in committee reports?) Does
the fact that many major statutes are now managed by leadership, rather
than by committee, reduce or increase the agency‘s role in the drafting
process and the delegation it ultimately receives?
It also is evident that those statutes that go through an unorthodox
legislative process (for example, the increasing tendency to skip the
conference committee stage, where statutes are cleaned up) are less
consistent textually, because they often bundle together multiple acts and
also may be more likely to contain mistakes. Those features may trigger
Chevron ambiguity in ways that Congress never expected or intended.
Should agencies be given more latitude to correct mistakes when statutes go
through exceedingly unorthodox processes?
Consider Chevron itself and the assumptions that it makes about the
Congress-court-agency relationship. Right now, Chevron is a very courtcentered doctrine precisely because of its link to statutory interpretation.
Chevron deference depends on ambiguity, but Chevron ambiguity depends
in large part on the application of the court-created presumptions of
interpretation. Chevron assumes that Congress is talking the language of
courts, and talking to courts, when it signals delegation. But what if
Congress is actually talking to agencies? The Gluck-Bressman findings
substantiate the intuition that most scholars of the modern administrative
state will have: in today‘s regulatory environment, Congress is focused
primarily on agencies, not on courts. Agencies are Congress‘s immediate,
frequent, and ongoing statutory interpreters. Because courts are involved, if
at all, much more rarely and usually further down the line, they are not on
typically on Congress radar to the extent that courts seem to expect.
But if congressional drafters themselves do not know the canons and if
many of those doctrines do not reflect actual drafting practice, how can
Chevron‘s canon-based test really effectuate congressional intent to
delegate? The Gluck-Bressman drafters told us that they use different
signals to communicate with agencies—for instance, directives in
legislative history or linguistic signaling conventions (―X in consultation
with Y,‖ e.g., to indicate which agency takes the lead)—that courts
generally do not consider. Indeed, these signals of delegation may be
present even when statutory text is ―clear‖ (and thus even when the
Chevron test, as the courts utilize it, would not find delegation). Wouldn‘t
a truly modern Chevron doctrine follow further down the path of Mead and
look to signals of how Congress talks to agencies rather than hinge on
doctrinal guideposts used by courts?
Finally—and this is a big one—consider in this light the link between
how Congress and agencies talk to one another and the Brand X case
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discussed in Part V. If Professors Bamberger and Strauss are correct109
(and I think they are) that Brand X turns judicial interpretations into Erielike provisional precedents awaiting agency interpretation of the statute,
why shouldn‘t the courts approach statutory interpretation in those
circumstances as agencies would? In other words, if Erie requires federal
courts interpreting state statutes to use the relevant state‘s interpretive
methodologies (as I think it does),110 why shouldn‘t federal courts,
interpreting federal statutes before an agency interpretation arises apply
them as agencies would?
Numerous scholars have documented how ―agency statutory
interpretation‖ is far more purposive, expert, aggressive, and political than
judicial interpretation.111 But no one has yet suggested that federal courts
take that same approach when they are standing in for federal agencies
under Brand X: that is, to decide statutory questions with the same
political, expert, and/or interpretive mindset that we expect from ―agency
statutory interpretation.‖112 That would be another ―WOW‖ moment.
(Would textualist judges use legislative history because an agency would?
Would left-wing judges pick a right-wing interpretation because the
President espouses that view?) But arguably it follows from the Brand X
rule, if that rule survives the next thirty years. At a minimum, the question
deserves some engagement.
CONCLUSION
Chevron is the doctrinal apotheosis of the modern legal era. It signals a
resounding shift of the center of the law‘s gravity away from judge-made
law toward statutes and their primary administrators. It therefore should
come as no surprise that thirty years of Chevron have lessons beyond the
administrative law context—specifically, lessons about the evolving and
uncertain role of the federal courts in the modern statutory landscape.
It seems as though the statutory era has suddenly caught up with the
federal courts. The courts may not have needed determinate statutory
interpretation doctrines, or doctrines whose legal bases and sources were
thoroughly understood, when statutory cases were the exception.
Understanding legislative behavior was perhaps not as important, and
certainly Congress itself operated with less complexity. Similarly, while in
the abstract it may make sense for democratically-accountable and
expertise-driven agencies to be able to change their minds as politics and
policy change, when laid next to more our general notion of precedent—
109. See generally Bamberger, supra note 88; Strauss, supra note 88.
110. Gluck, supra note 25, at 1926.
111. Mashaw, supra note 22, at 516–21 (detailing the prudential differences between
judicial and agency interpretation); see Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH.
L. REV. 355, 382–83 (2012) (arguing that a purposive interpretation of agency interpretation
more accurately reflects the reality of regulations); Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not
the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of
Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 322–29 (1990) (explaining how agency and
judicial readers differ in their interpretation).
112. Mashaw, supra note 22, at 504, 507–08.
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which is perhaps the central institutional feature of a common law judicial
system—the implications of the abrogation of statutory stare decisis are
potentially earth-shattering. How the federal courts will resolve these
challenges for the law of legislation remains to be seen; the courts are still
finding their way. But thirty years of Chevron put many of the challenges
in a new light.

